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In the European Parliament, a ‘rapporteur’ is an MEP appointed to oversee the drafting and
presentation of reports. This role is highly important in the Parliament, with rapporteurs being
elected to the position by their fellow MEPs. But does the distribution of these appointments favour
certain states over others? Steﬀen Hurka, Michael Kaeding and Lukas Obholzer present ﬁndings
from a study of the allocation of rapporteurs in the 2009-14 parliament. They ﬁnd that new member
states that joined in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements were underrepresented among rapporteurs
and were therefore less able to inﬂuence EU legislation than older member states.
In a recent study, we have assessed rapporteurship allocation in the seventh European Parliament
(EP, 2009-14). Our research produced surprising and potentially concerning results: We found that
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from newer Member states remain considerably less
likely to act as rapporteurs even during the second term after the Eastern enlargement (2009-14).
Most importantly, this trend also holds for shadow reports, which are a stepping stone toward lead
rapporteurships and easier to obtain.
The reason why this is highly relevant is simple: The European Parliament’s inﬂuence in the
decision-making process of the European Union is steadily growing. Among MEPs, the rapporteur is
the “primary legislator”. Rapporteurs and their “shadows” draft the legislature’s opinion and
negotiate on its behalf with the European Commission (Commission) and Council of Ministers
(Council).
As a consequence, they are the linchpin of intra and inter-institutional decision-making and have
important procedural privileges. As the importance of rapporteurs has increased, they have been
more tightly controlled by shadow rapporteurs from competing party groups. ‘Shadows’ follow the progress of a ﬁle
through committee and plenary, and can for instance join the rapporteur in closed-door trilogues with the
Commission and Council.
During the period since the admission of 13 new member states to the European Union starting in 2004, previous
research has found clear evidence that MEPs from new member states have been underrepresented in these key
posts. This might have been due to a ‘learning phase’: that is MEPs from the new member states were expected to
need some time to get used to the proceedings of the EP in order to get into inﬂuential positions. Hence, we did not
expect any systematic diﬀerence between MEPs from old and newer member states in rapporteurship allocation in
the seventh European Parliament – but our study suggests the opposite.
Report allocation in the EP ten years later: still no level playing ﬁeld
We re-examined the original argument and investigated the allocation of rapporteurships and shadow
rapporteurships in the 2009-14 term (EP7) to MEPs from one of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and
2007. Our dataset includes the allocation of 2,161 reports (see Figure 1) and 6,589 shadow reports to 851 MEPs,
i.e. the population of reports retrievable from the website of the EP after the last plenary session in April 2014. The
results show a clear deﬁcit in rapporteurships for MEPs from the new Member States despite the fact that the
distribution of reports is highly proportional to the party groups’ seat shares in the plenary. For shadow reports, our
results suggest that underrepresentation is particularly pronounced for politically important co-decision ﬁles.
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Figure 1: Report allocation across party groups and procedures (EP7)
Note: For more information on the calculations, see the authors’ accompanying journal
article. For more information on the groups, see: European People’s Party (EPP); Progressive
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D); Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
(ALDE); The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens–EFA); European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR); European United Left–Nordic Green Left (EUL/GUE-NGL); Europe of
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD – formerly EFD). NI refers to MEPs that are not
members of any group.
Figure 2: Report allocation of newcomer MEPs (percentage of MEPs with at least one report)
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Note: For more information, see the authors’ accompanying journal article.
In a nutshell, Figure 2 shows that the percentage of newcomer MEPs who obtained at least one report is
consistently higher among MEPs from the EU-15 than for those from the EU-13. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence between
the two groups amounts to 22 percentage points for all reports and 21 percentage points for co-decision reports.
Accordingly, the under-performance of MEPs from the accession states is not merely a result of a lack of political
experience. If this were the case, their rates of report allocation would be similar to the rates of newcomer MEPs
from the EU-15.
If we model the counts of allocated reports and derive predicted probabilities, an interesting picture emerges, shown
in Figure 3 below. For all shadow reports, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups of newcomer MEPs can
be discerned, although our models show that MEPs from the accession states are in general signiﬁcantly
underrepresented for co-decision shadow reports (see the accompanying paper for more details). For all lead
rapporteurships, the probability of receiving no report at all is clearly higher for newcomer MEPs from the accession
states than for their colleagues from the EU15. Interestingly, newcomer MEPs from the accession states are even
more likely to draft exactly one report, but their fortunes are reversed for two or more reports, leading to the
aggregate pattern of underrepresentation.
Figure 3: Report allocation: predicted probabilities for newcomer MEPs (all reports)
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Note: For more information, see the authors’ accompanying journal article.
Furthermore, our study revealed additional information about the allocation of rapporteurships: Chairmen and
chairwomen received more reports than regular or substitute committee members, due to the fact that they are
responsible for the drafting of reports which are not acquired by any political group. The results also underscore
previous ﬁndings on the importance of attendance rates for the allocation of reports. Party groups reward active
MEPs with inﬂuential positions in the legislative process. Also an MEP’s seniority is relevant for his or her chances
to obtain rapporteurships, which corroborates recent ﬁndings.
Variation across diﬀerent types of legislative procedures
Our results suggest, however, that the relationship does not hold across all types of legislative procedures. More
senior MEPs are especially active in the drafting of consultation reports, which raises the suspicion that experience
(and perhaps good contacts) are particularly relevant if the EP does not have any clear-cut procedural power. Our
results do not conﬁrm a gender discrimination eﬀect in the report allocation process. Female MEPs were neither
more nor less likely to obtain reports than their male colleagues across all legislative procedures. Finally, we ﬁnd
that MEPs whose home countries held the Council Presidency were underrepresented in the allocation of co-
decision reports. However, this ﬁnding does not hold for the other legislative procedures.
This raises important questions: chieﬂy, why has the under-representation of MEPs from formerly new Member
States in the post of rapporteur become a structural feature of the EP? There are three main readings of the
unexpected results: Firstly, the incentive set of this group of MEPs may diﬀer from that of MEPs from older member
states, making them less willing to take on the workload that accrues to a (shadow) rapporteur. Secondly, MEPs
from these countries may adopt diﬀerent methods for eﬀective representation of their constituents’ interests and
therefore have distinct skill sets. As a consequence, they may be better suited for other positions or activities than
those of the rapporteur. Thirdly, there might be a systematic bias in the rapporteurship allocation process,
disadvantaging MEPs from newer member states. As of now, it is an open question which of these arguments has
the most explanatory power.
In any case, MEPs from newer Member States are less able to inﬂuence European legislation as a result of their
4/5
absence from inﬂuential rapporteur positions. This might adversely aﬀect the legitimacy of European integration in
these countries. Therefore, MEPs from the newer member states may want to thrust themselves more actively into
the competition for rapporteurships during the 2014-19 legislative term. National parties might want to optimise their
candidate selection in order to ascertain that a share of their MEPs are committed to a longer term career at the
European level.
For more information on the study, see the authors’ article in the Journal of Common Market Studies
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